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Abstract 
This study examines the differences in the likelihood of overpayment and 
overemployment in establishments with and without works councils. In contrast to 
other studies, we use assessments by the management concerning the existence of 
such problems. Furthermore, we also analyze how different types of works councils 
influence the probability of overemployment and overpayment. Using the wave 2006 
of the IAB Establishment Panel, we show that establishments with works councils 
that are prepared to interfere with the management are more likely to suffer from 
overemployment but do not differ in the likelihood of overpayment compared to 
establishments without works councils. Establishments with works councils that are in 
line with the management, however, do not differ from establishments without a 
works council with regard to the likelihood of overemployment but have a lower 
likelihood of overpayment.        
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a long-standing debate in the literature on the effects of employee 
involvement in the operational decision-making of a firm. In Germany, wide-ranging 
codetermination rights are granted by law to employees, especially in personnel 
decisions, if they adopt a works council in their establishment. Thus works councils 
are, alongside unions, a powerful institution within the German system of industrial 
relations. The influence of such works councils has been examined since the mid-
1980s focusing on different topics such as productivity, R&D, profitability, wages and 
employment. Starting with FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987, 1990) as well as Kraft 
(1986), subsequent studies controversially discuss the gains and costs of German 
codetermination rights1.  
Almost all studies examine how objectively measured variables differ between 
establishments with and without works councils. In the case of wages, for example, 
recent studies find a remarkable wage markup in codetermined establishments2. 
Intuitively, this markup, in association with lower profitability, might be used in support 
of the hypothesis that works councils shift rents from the employer to the employees. 
The problem connected with these approaches, however, is that no point of 
reference is identified. High wages may well be justified if they are compensated by 
their main reference point, namely productivity. Productivity, however, may 
systematically differ between codetermined and non-codetermined establishments for 
many reasons, and may also be affected by the existence of works councils 
themselves. Hence, comparing the wage level between establishments with and 
without works councils, especially as an indication and source of rent shifting, might 
be misleading if economic reasons justify a difference.  
The point of reference is even more complicated if employment is considered. In 
principle the intersection of the wage rate with the labor demand curve should be 
used and this would also be related to establishment-specific characteristics such as 
productivity but in a non-trivial way. The German codetermination rights acknowledge 
a profound influence on hires and dismissals. At a minimum this might lead to 
                                            
1 Frege (2002), Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2004), and Jirjahn (2011) present surveys on the 
effects of works councils. 
2 See, e.g., Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001), Hübler and Jirjahn (2003), Gerlach and Meyer 
(2007), as well as Addison, Teixeira and Zwick (2010). 
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bureaucratization and delays in personnel decisions. A potentially inefficient 
employment level is empirically hard to identify because the absolute employment 
level has to be related to the establishment’s labor demand. 
In contrast to other studies our approach is based on subjective assessments of 
expected problems by the management, namely overemployment and overpayment. 
The advantage of our approach is that establishment-specific heterogeneity is 
expected to be taken up by the managers. The assessment of the existence of 
overpayment and overemployment implies too large a difference between the actual 
levels of wage and employment and, from the employer’s point of view, optimal levels 
of both variables rather than solely their absolute levels. As mentioned earlier, the 
crucial point with any statement on the appropriateness of a wage or employment 
level is the point of reference. In the case of wages, the relation to productivity 
matters and productivity will be the result of observable as well as unobservable 
qualification advantages or – as many argue – simply by the existence of a works 
council itself. Hence, in such situations a subjective evaluation of the wage level by 
the managers may turn out to be useful. Also, where overemployment exists, a 
subjective assessment by the management considers all establishment-specific 
background information that determines employment. This information is difficult for 
researchers from outside to take into account. Hence, in such circumstances, 
subjective appraisal by the management may be regarded as a more reliable 
measurement of the efficiency of an establishment’s recent employment level.  
In the first place, we consider the effect of the existence of a works council on both 
personnel issues. Subjective approaches to identify the influence of works councils 
on wages and employment are very rare. To our knowledge, only Gold (1999) uses a 
subjective measurement of overemployment as a dependent variable. Using the 
NIFA-Panel, he finds that managers of a codetermined establishment are more likely 
to report overemployment as well as excessive redundancy costs than managers of 
establishments without works councils. 
In the next step, we additionally control for heterogeneous effects of different types of 
work councils. Heterogeneity in the economic consequences of works councils due to 
different kinds of works council’s behavior has rarely been analyzed. This is probably 
caused by the difficulty in producing reliable classifications for works councils. 
Information on this issue is obviously hard to come by. Studies on the effects of 
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different works council types are performed by Dilger (2002, 2006) and Pfeifer 
(2011). Dilger (2002) examines how different types of works councils (own 
classification by Dilger) affect hires, dismissals, and turnover in the German 
mechanical engineering industry. He shows that works councils that intervene in day-
to-day business significantly reduce all three dependent variables. Works councils 
that do not intervene, however, have no significant influence. In a further study 
(Dilger, 2006) he takes up his approach from 2002 concerning the types of works 
councils and extends it by controlling for the relations between works councils and 
management. In addition to the results estimated in his earlier study, he now finds a 
reduction of subjectively measured profit levels but no effect on innovations in 
establishments with intervening works councils. Pfeifer (2011) shows that 
establishments with works councils have higher productivity, higher wages, and lower 
profitability. Using data which is fairly similar to ours, he also considers different types 
of works councils. He finds the strongest effects on productivity if works councils 
usually negotiate with the management and also agree to a compromise. The 
strongest effects on wages and profitability, however, are identified in establishment 
with works councils which negotiate with the management but do not usually come to 
a compromise. Works councils that are largely in line with the management have the 
weakest impact.  
Using wave 2006 from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show in this paper that on 
average in establishments with works councils (of all types) managers are more likely 
to complain of too large a number of employees. However, this is not true in the case 
of overpayment. If we additionally control for different types of works councils, we find 
strong evidence for heterogeneity: managers of establishments with negotiating 
works councils are more likely to complain of overemployment but are not more likely 
to complain of overpayment. In establishments with works councils that are mostly in 
line with the management, however, we find no higher likelihood of overemployment 
and in fact a lower probability for the existence of overpayment.     
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the legal 
background and theories regarding codetermination. In the 3rd section, we describe 
our data and variables. Section 4 contains an explanation of the econometric model 
that we use and a discussion of our results. Furthermore, Section 5 contains 
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inferences using an objective measured variable, namely labor costs. Finally, we 
conclude in Section 6.   
 
II. LEGAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The source of German codetermination rights is the Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). It allows the staff of every establishment with at least 
five employees to adopt a works council and provides, compared to other countries, 
extensive rights to information, consultation and codetermination. Codetermination 
rights mainly exist with respect to social and workplace-related aspects within an 
establishment. For example, works councils are able to prevent dismissals if these 
dismissals neglect social aspects such as age or family background. Another reason 
for intervention is if (in the view of the works council) further employment (possibly 
after retraining) is feasible. Furthermore, they can also veto with respect to a hiring if 
it is thought that the person to be hired will disturb the peace within the establishment 
(Betriebsfrieden) or the works council fears that the new employee will substitute 
permanent staff without an operational need for this reorganization. In the case of 
collective redundancies, works councils have to negotiate what is referred to as 
“social plans”. These plans determine redundancy payments and the periods of 
notice.  
The influence of works councils on wages is limited. Firstly, works councils are not 
allowed to participate directly in wage negotiations. Nor are they allowed to call 
strikes, and therefore they are not able to initiate the strongest form of industrial 
action. Furthermore, they cannot change parts of a collective bargaining agreement 
as long as no “opening clause” (Öffnungsklausel) of the agreement explicitly allows 
such an interference. Nevertheless, works councils are able to influence wages 
indirectly. If, for example, an establishment makes use of profit sharing, the works 
council has to bargain the organization and extent of such payments. Furthermore, 
works councils can negotiate benefits that go beyond the scale of collective 
bargaining agreements. Finally, collective bargaining agreements only define wage 
groups (Lohngruppen). Works councils and employers, however, have to determine 
which wage group should be used for a particular vacancy. Therefore, works councils 
indirectly define the wage that a particular worker earns.   
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The theory of codetermination is highly controversial. Jirjahn (2005) provides a 
detailed discussion about the possible effects of works councils from a theoretical 
point of view. On the one hand, in line with the property rights theory, it is argued that 
works councils negatively affect the economic performance of an establishment. 
They reduce its flexibility and adaptability to market conditions by reducing the room 
for maneuver of the management. Furthermore, they use their bargaining power 
resulting from codetermination rights to shift rents from the employer to employees. 
This will ultimately reduce profits, and obviously lower expected profits will also 
negatively affect the incentives to invest in such an establishment.  
As stated above, works councils are able to prevent or, at least, delay dismissals. 
One might therefore expect less flexibility where dismissals are inevitable for 
economic reasons. Based on this theory, it could be assumed that establishments 
with works councils will more often suffer from personnel problems and also realize a 
wage-employment relation which is off the profit-maximizing labor demand curve. 
This would be a contradiction to the popular Right-to-Manage approach and 
establishments with works councils would in this case more frequently state that 
overemployment prevails if works councils exist3. Overemployment may be a short- 
or long-term phenomenon. Most people will interpret it as a temporary phenomenon 
as management will find ways to reduce employment to its optimal level over time. 
Additionally, if overemployment were actually a permanent phenomenon, the 
management would simultaneously state that they expect to have overpayment 
because overemployment stands for a solution to the right of the labor demand 
curve. Then the wage would be higher than productivity. A major exception to this 
argumentation would be the existence of efficient contracts where the wage-
employment combination must be off the labor demand curve. In this case it would 
always be in the interest of the management to reduce employment (and to breach 
the efficient contract) 4.   
On the other hand, participation theory argues that codetermination can increase an 
establishment’s performance. Works councils improve communication between 
                                            
3 See Booth (1995) for a detailed discussion of different approaches to modeling labor market 
bargaining.  
4 Please note that in this case we implicitly assume that, in addition to wages, employment is part of 
the works council’s utility function. 
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employees and management in such a way that efficiency gains occur. Another line 
of argument is that the information rights granted to works councils may lead to 
reduced information asymmetries within an establishment. This would enable 
agreements to be reached which otherwise would not have been possible.  
Freeman and Lazear (1995), for example, argue that the information rights of works 
councils can decrease the likelihood of bankruptcy for an establishment. The reason 
being as follows: information asymmetries prevent the implementation of some 
pareto-efficient agreements between managers and employees if an ex-post break of 
such an agreement increases manager’s but decreases employee’s pay-offs. If the 
employees are aware of the incentives to break an agreement they would refuse 
such offers right away. In an unfavorable economic situation, for example, employees 
could decrease their claims toward the establishment in order to save their jobs if 
they trust the senior management. If a works council does not exist in an 
establishment, such concessions are less likely because the employees would then 
expect manager to exaggerate the gravity of the economic situation. With respect to 
our study, if participation theory describes reality well, establishments with works 
councils would be less likely to report personnel problems. 
 
III. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The aim of this study is to analyze how the existence of a works council influences 
the likelihood of an establishment suffering from overemployment and overpayment. 
As mentioned earlier, the innovative aspect of our study is the use of subjective 
evaluation by the senior management concerning perceived problems. Whilst 
subjective assessments are sometimes regarded as unreliable, the advantage of this 
approach in our view is that the management uses its perception of an optimal 
situation as a benchmark on which to base its assessment. This includes the location 
of the labor demand curve (from the view of the managers). Hence, this approach 
enables us to identify whether the relation between wage and labor is on or off the 
labor demand curve.  
This study uses the IAB Establishment Panel, Wave 2006. Access to the data was 
provided via remote access at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German 
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Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB)5. 
This panel is an annual survey of more than 15,000 German establishments. For the 
purpose of our study, we are only able to use data from 2006 because this is the only 
wave with information on the relations between works councils and management, 
which are subsequently used to differentiate between types of works councils. We 
restrict our sample to establishments with at least five employees because smaller 
establishments are not allowed to adopt a works council. Furthermore, we drop 
observations from agriculture, nonprofit organizations, and public administration. 
Finally, our sample contains 5940 observations. Table 1 shows means and standard 
deviations of our variables.  
We examine the influence of works councils on two dichotomous variables. The first 
variable, overemployment, has unit value if the management of the establishment 
states that they expect to have too many employees during the next two years. In our 
sample, 9.7 percent of the establishments surveyed report that they expect such a 
problem. The second dependent variable is overpayment. This variable takes unit 
value if an establishment foresees a high financial burden on wage costs during the 
next two years. 36.9 percent of all establishments state that they are confronted with 
this problem.  
In section 5, we will also use an objective measure as dependent variable, i.e. 
wages, in order to draw additional inferences. The IAB Establishment Panel contains 
just one piece of information regarding labor costs: the establishments state the total 
amount of gross pay in the month of June 2006 excluding the employer's social 
security contribution. We divide this variable by the number of employees and use its 
logarithmic value as a proxy for mean monthly ln(wage).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
5 For a detailed description of the IAB Establishment Panel, see Kölling (2000). 
9 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. 
Overemployment 0.097 0.296 
Overpayment 0.369 0.482 
Works council 0.354 0.478 
Works council (type A) 0.277 0.448 
Works council (type B) 0.077 0.267 
Increasing Sales 0.322 0.467 
Decreasing Sales 0.139 0.345 
Saturday 0.670 0.470 
Temporary work 0.020 0.059 
Technology 0.703 0.457 
Collect. agreement (firm level) 0.090 0.286 
Collect. agreement (industry level) 0.442 0.497 
Outsource 0.037 0.188 
Insource 0.033 0.178 
Single establishment 0.709 0.454 
Share of low-educated workers 0.183 0.252 
Share of highly educated workers 0.087 0.157 
Share of part-time contracts 0.152 0.205 
Share of fixed term contracts 0.052 0.118 
Active owner         0.478              0.500 
Labor costs per employee    2102.862          971.766 
Employment      138.498          290.833 
No. of obs. 5940 
 
             Note: Due to missing values, Labor costs is only observed in 5281 establishments. 
 
Our main independent variable is works council. This is a dummy variable that has 
unit value if a works council exists in an establishment. In our sample, 35.4 percent of 
all establishments have a works council. This is a high share of codetermined 
establishments. Beckmann, Föhr and Kräckel (2010) use representative data and 
show that 13.7% of all German establishments with more than 5 employees had a 
works council in 2006. Our relatively high number of codetermined establishments 
results from the fact that the likelihood of the existence of a works council increases 
with establishment size and large establishments are overrepresented in the IAB 
Establishment Panel. In a second part of our study, we consider different types of 
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works council. The types are defined according to the behavior of a works council 
towards the management. We test empirically whether the estimated effects depend 
on the type of works council or not.  
The industrial relations-oriented literature on works councils has been discussing for 
some time how the types of works councils can be distinguished. Kotthoff (1981, 
1994) identifies 6 types of works councils, namely isolated, ignored, behaving as a 
part of the management, autonomous, respected, and cooperative but exerting 
countervailing power. Nienhüser (2005) characterizes the first three types of works 
councils as weak works councils and the last three types as strong works councils.  
The IAB Establishment Panel does not contain as much differentiated information 
about different types of works councils. Instead, for our purpose, we just use two 
different types of works councils based on evaluations by the management. Originally 
the management was given the three following alternatives (only one statement is 
possible): 
 
 1 Business decisions usually have to be put through against the works/staff 
     council. 
 2 The works/staff council often diverges from the management’s opinion when 
     it comes to business decisions; nevertheless a consensual solution is    
     eventually found in most cases. 
 3 Most business decisions are mutually agreed upon by the works/staff council 
    and the management. 
 
Alternative 1 has only been selected by about 1% of all observations. As this low 
number implies too few observations for a useful empirical test, we merge option 1 
and 2 to what we call works council type A. The second kind of works council is of a 
more cooperative type and we call them works council type B. While the 
management in 27.7 percent of all establishments reports having a works council of 
the first type, the second type only exists in 7.7 percent of all observations. Hence, 
put differently for those establishments where a works council exists, 78.2 percent of 
all managers asses their work council as being of type A and 21.8 percent of all 
managers asses their works council as a type B representative body. Clearly this 
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dichotomization aims at distinguishing works councils according to how vigorously 
worker interests are pursued. Some may prefer to call the type A works council a 
strong one and the type B works council a weak one. 
The way the works councils behave will affect their bargaining power and, as 
bargaining power is mainly used for rent-sharing activities, type B works councils are 
expected to be less successful in claiming rents. If this hypothesis is true and wages 
and employment are part of the utility function of works councils, in both areas less 
problems are expected to be stated compared to the situation when a type A works 
council is present.  
We consider several additional covariates. First we control for expected changes in 
sales in 2006. If, sales are expected to increase in the near future, the management 
will probably less frequently state that overemployment is a problem. In contrast, if 
the sales forecast is pessimistic, problems will be more likely because fewer 
employees are necessary.  
In order to control for expected changes in sales and also for different effects of 
decreasing or increasing sales, we generate two different dummy variables. The 
variable increasing sales has unit value if sales in 2006 are expected to increase and 
equals zero if sales stagnate or decrease. In contrast, the variable decreasing sales 
has unit value if sales are expected to decrease in 2006 and equals zero otherwise. 
Furthermore, it is possible that flexibility in employment and working time may also 
affect the existence of personnel problems. In order to control for employment 
flexibility we add the variable temporary work into our model. This variable is defined 
as the ratio of temporary workers to all employees. A higher share of temporary work 
increases the flexibility of the management to react to personnel problems, especially 
to overemployment.  
Such flexibility can also be reached through fixed-term contracts. Hence, we 
generate the variable share of fixed term contracts, i.e. the number of employees with 
a fixed term contract divided by total employment. A high share of fixed term 
contracts enables a fairly smooth adjustment of employment in the short run simply 
by not extending such contracts. Hence problems with overemployment should be 
less frequently reported.  
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As an alternative to adjusting the number of workers, the number of hours may be 
altered if necessary. This hypothesis is considered by the variable Saturday, which is 
a dummy variable that has unit value if the employees of an establishment work 
Saturdays on demand.  
Part-time employment might also affect adjustment behavior by increasing the 
possibilities of the management to deploy the employees. If this were true, 
overemployment should pose less of a problem. We measure the influence of 
working time flexibility by share of part-time contracts. Share of part-time contracts is 
the share of employees with part-time contracts divided by total employment.  
We also control for the influence of collective bargaining agreements. In Germany, 
two different kinds of collective bargaining agreements exist. Usually, unions and 
employer’s associations negotiate wages at industry level. Hence, we add the 
dummy collect. agreement (industry level) to our model and this dummy has unit 
value if the establishment is covered by such a collective bargaining agreement. As 
an alternative to industry-wide agreements, however, a company and a union can 
agree to a collective bargaining agreement at company level. We also control for the 
effect of such agreements by the dummy collect. agreement (firm level).   
Furthermore, we control for the influence of the use of a more or less advanced 
technology by the establishment. In the IAB Establishment Panel the management 
has to  rate its technology compared to other establishments of the same industry, on 
a five-level Likert scale where 1 means “state-of-the-art” and 5 “obsolete”. We 
generate a dummy technology that has unit value if the management rates its 
technology with 1 or 2. The effect of technological advance is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, advanced technology could reduce production costs so the firm would achieve 
a competitive advantage in comparison to its rivals. This would positively affect 
growth and employment prospects.  If this were true, less personnel problems should 
be expected. On the other hand, advanced technology could also be applied to 
substitute labor. Hence, overemployment in particular would arise, at least 
temporarily.  
If an establishment has to implement strong structural adjustments, the probability of 
personnel problems might be affected. Insourcing and outsourcing in particular are 
likely to influence the expectation of problems with respect to overemployment if the 
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labor force cannot be adjusted smoothly. To take account of possible influences of 
this kind we add two dummy variables, insource and outsource. Insource has unit 
value if other establishments or establishment units have been integrated into the 
observed establishment. In this case personnel problems could arise if the integrated 
units are suboptimally adapted. Outsource has unit value if parts of the observed 
establishment are outsourced. Outsourcing is a method of reducing recent problems 
in an establishment. Hence, there may be less likelihood of problems in the future.  
Additionally, we add the dummy single establishment in order to distinguish between 
single establishments and establishments that are part of a multi-site company. Multi-
site companies have the option of relocating capacities between different 
establishments, implying that problems regarding labor costs and employment can be 
reduced more easily. Hence, it can be expected that single establishments are more 
likely to suffer from personnel problems.   
Furthermore, we also take the qualification level of employees into account. For this 
purpose, we add two variables to our regression. The variable share of low-educated 
workers is defined as the number of less skilled employees divided by total 
employment. In contrast, share of highly educated workers is defined as the share of 
employees with a university degree.  
In addition, active involvement of the capital owners in decision making could 
influence the probability of assessing the recent employment level and wage level as 
overemployment and overpayment. In many cases companies are nowadays led by 
managers who do not hold any capital shares. Their decisions on wage and 
employment levels only indirectly affect their personal income. This is obviously 
different for capital owners and therefore the assessment as to whether a problem 
exists or not may be determined by capital ownership.  
An active owner might state such problems because overemployment and 
overpayment reduce profits. Hence, it is the owner’s business income that is directly 
involved. In contrast, the remuneration of an employed manager does not depend, or 
at most only partially depends, on the establishment’s profits so that his or her 
perception of personnel problems might be less sensitive. We control for the 
influence of active ownership through the dummy active owner that has unit value if 
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at least one owner or a family member of the owner works in the establishment6. In 
order to take size effects into account, we add several size dummies to our 
regression. Finally, we also add industry dummies and state (German Bundesländer) 
dummies to our model to control for state specific effects and industry specific 
effects.   
 
IV. METHOD AND RESULTS 
The aim of this study is to analyze the influence of works councils on two binary 
variables. As OLS ignores the discreteness of our dependent variables and also 
leads to predictions above zero and below one, we estimate a Probit model. Clearly, 
we could estimate two univariate Probit models. This, however, would ignore a 
potential correlation between the error terms of both equations. Hence, we estimate a 
bivariate Probit model that accounts for correlated disturbances. This model can be 
deduced from a generalized index function model with two latent variables y1* and y2* 
that may be correlated7. These variables are defined as: 
* T *
1 1 1 1 1 1y x u , y 1 if y 0, 0 otherwise,      
* T *
2 2 2 2 2 2y x u , y 1 if y 0, 0 otherwise,      
where u1 and u2 are joint normal with zero means, variances one, and correlation  . 
If 0  , two separate Probit models could be estimated because both error terms are 
independent. However, if 0,  two independently estimated Probit equations would 
be inefficient. The bivariate Probit model relaxes the assumption of independence. 
Here, the bivariate normal cdf is 
T T
1 1 2 2x x
T T
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2(x , x , ) (z , z , )dz dz
 
 
         
where 
                                            
6 The wave 2006 of the IAB Establishment Panel does not contain detailed information about the 
position of the owner in the establishment. We only know how many working proprietors and unpaid 
family members are employed in the establishment. Although this information does not ensure that the 
proprietor manages the establishment, we use this variable as a proxy for active management by the 
owner because it is unlikely that the owner of an establishment does not have the last word in the 
decision-making at his or her establishment.  
7 For a detailed discussion about bivariate Probit models, see Greene (2008). 
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T 2 T 2 T T
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 22
1 ((x ) (x ) 2 x x )
2(1 )
T T
1 1 2 2 1
2 2
e(x , x , )
2 (1 )
       
    
 
. 
Therefore, the log likelihood function is 
 
N
T T
i1 i1 1 i2 i2 2 i
i 1
ln L ln (q x ,q x , )

      
with 
i1 i1q 2y 1  , 
i2 i2q 2y 1  , 
and 
i i1 i2q q
   . 
Within this framework, we estimate two different models. The model is based on the 
following equations  
T
i 1 1 i 1 i i1Overemployment W X u       
and 
T
i 2 2 i 2 i i2Overpayment W X u      . 
In the first model, Wi is substituted by the works council dummy. Hence, this model 
treats works councils in accordance with almost all literature as a unitary variable. 
The second model contains the variables works council (type A) and works council 
(type B) instead of the variable works council. So it additionally controls for potential 
heterogeneity in works councils behavior.  
Table 2 shows the results of our estimates and the first two columns contain our 
estimates without controlling for heterogeneity of works councils. The last two 
columns show the estimated effects of different kinds of works councils. A Wald test 
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always rejects independence of overemployment and overpayment so that a 
correlation between both error terms exists8.  
Regarding the results which are based on the simple distinction of whether a works 
council exists or not, we find that establishments with a works council are more likely 
to suffer from overemployment. Overpayment, however, does not occur more 
frequently in codetermined establishments. If we control for heterogeneity of works 
councils, we find different results: type A works councils increase the likelihood of 
overemployment and do not affect the likelihood of overpayment. In contrast, type B 
works councils do not affect the likelihood of overemployment and even reduce the 
likelihood of overpayment. 
Most of the control variables work well in both models. If sales are expected to 
increase, the probability that overemployment problems will be reported is reduced. 
In contrast, if sales are expected to decrease, in the view of the managers both 
overemployment and overpayment become more probable. The use of temporary 
work decreases the likelihood that overemployment will be a problem during the next 
two periods. Advanced technology reduces expected problems with respect to 
employment and payment. Hence, advanced technology appears to affect 
employment prospects positively. Collective bargaining at industry level is connected 
with more complaints by managers concerning expected overpayment.  
Insourcing always leads to a higher likelihood of problems observed with 
overemployment as well as with overpayment in the near future. In contrast to our 
stated hypothesis, managers from single establishments do not expect problems with 
respect to overpayment and with respect to overemployment. Low and high 
qualification levels have the expected effects with respect to the probability that 
overpayment problems are stated. Active ownership has no effect on 
overemployment. The management from these establishments, however, more 
frequently state overpayment, which could be explained by a more aggressive 
counteraction against higher wages. 
 
  
                                            
8 The p-values of these tests are in the third from last row of each table. 
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Table 2  
Regression results (full sample)  
Bivariate Probit 
                            Dep. Var. 
 
Variables 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Works council      0.323*** (0.072) 
       -0.044 
(0.053)   
Works council (Type A)       0.392*** (0.076) 
0.035 
(0.057) 
Works council (Type B)   0.149 (0.103) 
  -0.242*** 
(0.073) 
Increasing sales   -0.190*** (0.059) 
0.045 
(0.039) 
  -0.187*** 
(0.059) 
0.047 
(0.039) 
Decreasing sales     0.697***      (0.061) 
   0.156*** 
(0.051) 
    0.696*** 
(0.061) 
    0.154*** 
(0.051) 
Saturday 0.030  (0.055) 
   0.141*** 
(0.039) 
0.028           
(0.055) 
   0.141*** 
(0.039) 
Temporary work   -1.932*** (0.624) 
0.248 
(0.300) 
   -1.979***      
(0.638) 
0.216 
(0.301) 
Technology  -0.115**        (0.052) 
  -0.103*** 
(0.038) 
  -0.112**        
(0.052) 
   -0.100*** 
(0.038) 
Collect. agreement  
(firm level) 
       -0.033          
(0.091) 
0.040 
(0.067) 
       -0.036          
(0.091) 
0.034 
(0.067) 
Collect. agreement  
(industry level) 
0.009           
(0.059) 
  0.085** 
(0.042) 
0.004           
(0.059) 
 0.079* 
(0.042) 
Outsource 0.143           (0.120) 
0.117 
(0.091) 
0.140           
(0.108) 
0.109 
(0.091) 
Insource   0.254** (0.120) 
  0.231** 
(0.094) 
   0.238**        
(0.120) 
   0.214*** 
(0.094) 
Single establishment        -0.019    (0.059) 
0.054 
(0.044) 
       -0.012          
(0.059) 
0.062 
(0.044) 
Share of low-educated 
workers 
0.088           
(0.111) 
  0.186** 
(0.079) 
0.092           
(0.111) 
  0.188** 
(0.079) 
Share of highly educated 
workers 
       -0.008 
(0.184) 
 -0.350** 
(0.139) 
       -0.013 
(0.185) 
   -0.360*** 
(0.139) 
Share of part-time contracts 0.042           (0.135) 
       -0.041 
(0.102) 
0.051 
(0.135) 
       -0.033 
(0.102) 
Share of fixed term 
contracts 
       -0.266 
(0.231) 
       -0.086 
(0.146) 
       -0.228 
(0.230) 
       -0.062 
(0.147) 
Active owner        -0.019 (0.057) 
   0.269*** 
(0.042) 
       -0.013          
(0.057) 
   0.275***     
(0.042) 
p-value of Wald test [ 0  ] <0.001 <0.001 
McFadden-R2 0.074 0.076 
No. of obs. 5940 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. Size dummies, state 
dummies and industry dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis.  
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In a Probit model, the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal 
effects. Hence, we calculate the influence of the existence of a works council on 
overemployment and overpayment by calculating the difference between the average 
predicted probabilities of codetermined and non-codetermined establishments. These 
marginal effects are presented in Table 3. The standard errors of the marginal effects 
are calculated by the delta method. As we are only interested in the marginal effects 
of works councils, we waive to show the effects of the other variables for reasons of 
clarity. Additionally, we calculate semi-elasticities in order to control for the relative 
effect of a works council. Remember that only 9.7 percent of all establishments suffer 
from overemployment, but 36.9 percent of all establishments suffer from 
overpayment. Hence, solely interpreting the absolute effect (i.e. marginal effect) of 
the works council dummies might lead to a distorted picture. As with marginal effects, 
we calculate semi-elasticities by calculating the difference between the average 
logarithm of the predicted probability of stating problems of codetermined and non-
codetermined establishments. That is, the average semi-elasticity of a dependent 
variable is 
i
N
Y
i 1
1 SE
N 
  whereas 
 
iY i i i i
SE ln(Y | Works council 1) ln(Y | Works council 0)    , 
 
and Yi is the probability that the management states that its establishment suffers 
from overemployment and overpayment. The estimated semi-elasticities are also 
shown in Table 3.  
Regarding the marginal effect of works council, we find that the likelihood that an 
establishment with a works council will suffer from overemployment is 5.1 percentage 
points higher than the likelihood in an establishment without a works council. 
Expressed in relative terms, works councils increase the likelihood of 
overemployment by 60.4 percent. The likelihood of the existence of problems with 
overpayment in codetermined establishments does not significantly differ from the 
likelihood in establishments without a works council. Summarizing, these results 
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show that the existence of a works council implies a higher likelihood of finding a 
wage-labor relation that is off the labor demand curve9.  
Regarding the results with works councils differentiated according to their type, we 
find a strong heterogeneity in our results: the likelihood that an establishment will 
suffer from overemployment increases by 6.5 percentage points if its works council 
has been classified as being of type A. Expressed in proportional terms, the 
likelihood that the management of such an establishment will state overemployment 
increases by 72.0 percent. In contrast, we find no significant effect on overpayment.  
 
Table 3 
Effects of works councils on overemployment and on overpayment (full sample) 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. Standard errors are 
calculated by the delta method. 
 
                                            
9 Due to our cross-sectional data, we are not able to control whether overemployment is permanent or 
just the result of a delaying of necessary adjustment of employment by works councils. 
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Overemployment Overpayment 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Works council        0.051*** (0.012)  
      -0.015 
(0.019)  
Works council (Type A)     0.065*** (0.014) 
 0.013 
(0.020) 
Works council (Type B)  0.024 (0.018) 
   -0.083*** 
(0.024) 
p-value of F-test 
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BME ME   0.012                 <0.001 
 Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Works council    0.604*** (0.133)  
      -0.046 
(0.056)  
Works council  
Type A  
   0.720*** 
(0.135)  
0.037 
(0.059) 
Works council  
Type B  
0.277 
(0.186)  
  -0.272*** 
(0.088) 
p-value of F-test  
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BSE SE   0.008       <0.001 
  
No. of obs. 5940 
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Works councils that are in line with the management (works council type B), however, 
have quite different effects. Here, the management does not report overemployment 
more frequently than establishments without works councils. Surprisingly, we find a 
strong negative impact on the likelihood of overpayment. This likelihood is reduced 
by 8.3 percentage points for establishments with works councils of type B which is, in 
relative terms, a reduction of 27.2 percent10.  
A Wald test also rejects equality of the marginal effects at 5%-level (p-value: 0.012) 
and of the semi-elasticities (p-value: 0.008) in the overemployment equation. In the 
overpayment equation, equality can also be rejected. The p-values of the marginal 
effect and the semi-elasticity are p<0.001. 
The Works Constitution Act grants a works council extended codetermination rights if 
an establishment employs more than 20 workers. Works councils in larger 
establishments have additional codetermination rights regarding hires and the 
transfer of employees. Furthermore, the management must also keep the works 
council informed at least once every quarter about the economic situation of the 
establishment11. Due to the fact that these additional rights especially concerning 
employment increase the bargaining power of a works council, we repeat our 
estimates with a subsample that only contains establishments with more than 20 
employees. Table A1 in the appendix shows the estimated coefficients of all 
covariates based on this subsample. Table 4 contains the estimated marginal effects 
and semi-elasticities of our main independent variables. 
Compared to the estimates with the complete sample, we find slightly different results 
regarding the existence of overemployment and overpayment in codetermined 
establishments. Without controlling for heterogeneity of works councils, the estimated 
difference in the likelihood that the establishments suffer from overemployment is 5.3 
                                            
10 A potential limitation of our approach is a selectivity-induced bias. Whether a works council exists or 
not is decided by the employees. Therefore, the possibility cannot be excluded that the existence of a 
works council is not random. Thus, if we do not control for the reason of existence, our results will be 
biased. Due to our cross-sectional data, we are not able to use panel methods to control for such 
selectivity. Furthermore, we do not have appropriate instruments. However, our variables defuse a 
potential selectivity problem. Jirjahn (2011) argues that works councils are introduced in 
establishments which expect a worsening of the economic situation. In contrast to other studies, we 
control for expectations through the variables increasing sales and decreasing sales so that an omitted 
variable bias caused by expectations should pose less of a problem or none at all. 
11 See Pulte (2009) for a more detailed description of the link between firm size and codetermination 
rights. 
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percentage points (i.e. 56.8 percent) higher than in establishments without works 
councils. Hence, in absolute as well as relative terms, the effect is similar to the 
previous results based on the full sample. We also find no significant effect on the 
existence of overpayment.  
 
Table 4 
Effects of works councils on overemployment and on overpayment (N>20) 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. Standard errors are 
calculated by the delta method. 
 
Regarding the estimates that control for different kinds of works councils, we still find 
that the likelihood of overemployment in codetermined establishments is higher than 
the likelihood of overemployment in non-codetermined establishments if the works 
council is characterized as a type A works council.  We also find no significant effect 
of type B works councils on overemployment. Additionally, the null hypothesis of 
equality of these effects can still be rejected at 5%-level. In the case of overpayment, 
our results are also similar to the previous results. The influence of type A works 
councils is still insignificant and the marginal effect is very close to zero. Type B 
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Overemployment Overpayment 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Works council        0.053*** (0.013)  
       -0.008 
(0.021)  
Works council (Type A)      0.067*** (0.015) 
 0.023 
(0.023) 
Works council (Type B)  0.028 (0.021) 
   -0.083*** 
(0.027) 
p-value of F-test 
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BME ME   0.033                 <0.001 
 Semielasticities 
(Std. error) 
Semielasticities 
(Std. error) 
Works council    0.568*** (0.145)  
      -0.022 
(0.057)  
Works council  
Type A  
   0.673*** 
(0.145)  
0.062 
(0.061) 
Works council  
Type B  
0.271 
(0.185)  
  -0.242*** 
(0.086) 
p-value of F-test  
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BSE SE   0.013       <0.001 
  
No. of obs. 3662 
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works councils, however, still have a negative and highly significant coefficient. Both 
marginal effects are again significantly different from each other (p-value: <0.001).    
Summarizing our results, we find strong differences between the two types of works 
councils. Without controlling for heterogeneity, we find that establishments with works 
councils more frequently report problems with overemployment, but do not suffer 
from overpayment more frequently than establishments without this form of worker 
representation. Our findings are not easy to interpret on the basis of the property 
rights and the participation theory. The absence of complaints of too high wages 
supports the view of positive productivity effects of such an institution. The higher 
likelihood that managers will complain of overemployment is evidence in favor of the 
property rights theory12. Perhaps works councils have “two faces”.  
 
V. INFERENCE USING OBJECTIVE MEASURES 
Given that our estimations are based on subjective measures of the economic 
situation and that the results concerning overpayment are somewhat surprising, we 
compare the results with objective measures. In doing so, we mainly repeat the 
approach of Pfeifer (2011) to estimate the impact of different types of works councils 
on wages13. Table A2 in the appendix contains the results of a regression on 
ln(wage) with both types of works councils as independent variables14.   
Unfortunately, some establishments do not report their labor costs. Therefore the 
number of observations drops to 5281 in the large sample (N>4) and to 3261 in the 
small sample (N>20). The lower number of observations might affect the 
comparability of the estimates on wages and the estimates on our subjective 
variables if some establishments with a specific set of personnel problems do not 
state their labor costs. In order to test for such a possible selectivity bias, we also 
repeat the estimations on the subjective variables using the reduced number of 
                                            
12 This conclusion is not true with respect to type B works councils. 
13 Due to poor data, we only estimate wage equations and do not estimate production functions 
because the IAB Establishment Panel does not contain information about capital, and only contains an 
inaccurate definition of intermediate inputs. 
14 Note that, in contrast to our previous models, we forego the use of dummies for expected sales 
growth as independent variables in this model because such expectations should have no causal 
effect on recent average wage costs in an establishment. 
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observations. These results are presented in Tables A4 to A6 of the appendix. The 
results of these regressions are almost identical to our previous results. Hence, on 
this basis, the hypothesis for a selection-induced bias finds no support.  
Regarding the regressions on wages, we find a wage markup in codetermined 
establishments for both types of works council. However the markup is not of the 
same magnitude. Compared with establishments without a works council, wages in 
establishments with type A works councils are approx. 16 percent higher.  
Establishments with type B works councils, however, have a wage markup of approx. 
13 percent. Both markups are also significantly different from each other at 5%-level 
in both samples. Note that the management of establishments with type B works 
councils less frequently state that they suffer from overpayment. Hence, based on the 
results of the subjective and objective wage variables together, the wage markup in 
these establishments must be overcompensated by higher productivity. In 
establishments with type A works councils, wage markup and productivity seem to 
offset each other.    
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this study, we examine whether, from the manager’s point of view, codetermined 
establishments more frequently report having a high financial burden on wage costs 
and overemployment. Furthermore, we also consider heterogeneity in the behavior 
of works councils and investigate whether different types of works councils have 
different effects on the reported problems regarding payment and employment.  
Our results show that in comparison with establishments without works councils 
codetermined establishments more frequently suffer from overemployment but do 
not suffer more frequently from overpayment. Apparently, higher wages in 
codetermined establishments that have been identified in previous studies seem not 
to be perceived as a problem by the management. Probably, higher productivity 
countervails.  
According to our results the main effect of works councils is on employment and this 
impact is in accordance with the Works Constitution Act, which explicitly grants 
codetermination rights in this area. Works councils are (in theory) expected to 
abstain from wage bargaining. If they have an impact on remuneration this seems to 
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be compensated by higher productivity. In our view these results also show that rent 
sharing is more than higher wages. Employment or employment protection is a 
highly valued good, which apparently is a determinant of the works councils’ utility 
function. 
As expected, in most cases works council do not lead to pareto improvements, as 
redistribution takes place. However this is not true for works councils of type B. 
Finally, our results raise questions regarding future research. More research, 
especially on overemployment in codetermined establishments, is necessary. Is the 
higher likelihood of overemployment in codetermined establishments a temporary 
phenomenon, i.e. do works councils only delay dismissals, or does overemployment 
exist permanently? If the latter were true, do works councils lead to the 
implementation of efficient contracts because, for example, they are able to enforce 
their stability? 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Effects of works councils on overemployment and overpayment (20<N) 
Bivariate Probit 
                            Dep. Var. 
 
Variables 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Works council     0.313*** (0.079) 
-0.022 
(0.059)   
Works council (Type A)      0.377*** (0.082) 
0.063 
(0.063) 
Works council (Type B)   0.154 (0.108) 
  -0.232*** 
(0.078) 
Increasing sales 
  -0.233*** 
(0.069) 
-0.012 
(0.048) 
  -0.230*** 
(0.069) 
-0.009 
(0.048) 
Decreasing sales 
   0.679*** 
(0.076) 
  0.166** 
(0.067) 
   0.680*** 
(0.076) 
   0.165** 
(0.067) 
Saturday 
0.064 
(0.070) 
  0.147*** 
(0.052) 
0.061 
(0.070) 
   0.147*** 
(0.052) 
Temporary work 
   -2.193*** 
(0.713) 
       -0.022 
(0.337) 
   -2.240*** 
(0.729) 
       -0.062 
(0.339) 
Technology 
  -0.158** 
(0.064) 
  -0.119** 
(0.049) 
  -0.154** 
(0.064) 
 -0.114** 
(0.049) 
Collect. agreement  
(firm level) 
       -0.015 
(0.103) 
0.013 
(0.078) 
-0.020 
(0.103) 
0.002 
(0.079) 
Collect. agreement  
(industry level) 
-0.032 
(0.072) 
  0.106** 
(0.054) 
-0.040 
(0.073) 
 0.096* 
(0.054) 
Outsource 
0.199* 
(0.115) 
0.145 
(0.100) 
 0.198* 
(0.115) 
0.138 
(0.100) 
Insource 
 0.232* 
(0.130) 
 0.182* 
(0.104) 
 0.215* 
(0.130) 
0.161 
(0.104) 
Single establishment 
       -0.002 
(0.064) 
0.014 
(0.050) 
0.008 
(0.064) 
0.022 
(0.050) 
Share of low-educated 
workers 
0.083 
(0.134) 
   0.268*** 
(0.099) 
0.087 
(0.133) 
   0.271*** 
(0.100) 
Share of highly educated 
workers 
-0.083 
(0.233) 
   -0.470*** 
(0.177) 
       -0.089 
(0.234) 
   -0.484*** 
(0.177) 
Share of part-time contracts 
       -0.010 
(0.184) 
       -0.043 
(0.142) 
-0.021 
(0.184) 
       -0.057 
(0.143) 
Share of fixed term 
contracts 
       -0.065 
(0.301) 
0.112 
(0.203) 
       -0.012 
(0.301) 
0.153 
(0.204) 
Active owner 
       -0.065 
(0.070) 
   0.332*** 
(0.052) 
       -0.056 
(0.070) 
   0.344*** 
(0.052) 
p-value of Wald test [ 0  ] <0.001 <0.001 
McFadden-R2 0.073 0.073 
No. of obs. 3662 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table A2 
Effects of heterogeneous works councils on ln(labor costs) 
OLS regression  
Sample 4<N 20<N 
Variables            Coeff.         (Std.error) 
             Coeff. 
          (Std.error) 
Works council (Type A) 
 
             0.171*** 
            (0.015) 
             0.158*** 
            (0.015) 
Works council (Type B) 
 
             0.133*** 
            (0.018) 
             0.124*** 
            (0.018) 
Saturday 
             0.005 
            (0.011) 
            -0.006 
            (0.013) 
Temporary work 
             0.165* 
            (0.055) 
             0.142 
            (0.088) 
Technology 
             0.020*** 
            (0.011) 
             0.012 
            (0.011) 
Collect. agreement (firm level) 
             0.042** 
            (0.017) 
             0.034*** 
            (0.018) 
Collect. agreement (industry level) 
            -0.008 
            (0.011) 
            -0.008 
            (0.013) 
Outsource 
             0.013 
            (0.025) 
             0.029 
            (0.025) 
Insource 
             0.036 
            (0.024) 
             0.051** 
            (0.025) 
Single establishment 
            -0.026** 
            (0.011) 
            -0.018 
            (0.012) 
Share of low-educated workers 
            -0.265*** 
            (0.024) 
            -0.254*** 
            (0.027) 
Share of highly educated workers 
             0.700*** 
            (0.034) 
             0.728*** 
            (0.041) 
Share of part-time contracts 
            -0.830*** 
            (0.038) 
            -0.781*** 
            (0.050) 
Share of fixed term contracts 
            -0.078* 
            (0.046) 
            -0.238*** 
            (0.058) 
Active Owner 
            -0.043*** 
            (0.011) 
            -0.031*** 
            (0.012) 
No. of obs. 5281          3261 
R2 0.552          0.600 
p-value of F-test [ WoCo Type A WoCo Type B   ] 0.018          0.033 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table A3 
Regression results of the main independent variables without establishments that do not state labor  
costs (full sample) 
Bivariate Probit 
                            Dep. Var. 
 
Variables 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Works council      0.296*** (0.077) 
-0.058 
 (0.057)   
Works council (Type A)       0.373*** (0.082) 
0.011 
(0.061) 
Works council (Type B)   0.100 (0.109) 
  -0.226*** 
(0.077) 
p-value of Wald test [ 0  ] <0.001 <0.001 
McFadden-R2 0.073 0.074 
No. of obs. 5281 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. All previously used 
covariates are included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.        
 
Table A4  
Effects of works councils on overemployment and on overpayment variables without establishments 
that do not state labor costs (full sample) 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. Standard errors are 
calculated by the delta method. 
 
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Overemployment Overpayment 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Works council        0.047*** (0.013)  
      -0.021 
(0.020)  
Works council (Type A)     0.062*** (0.015) 
 0.004 
(0.022) 
Works council (Type B)  0.016 (0.016) 
   -0.078*** 
(0.026) 
p-value of F-test 
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BME ME   0.006            0.000 
 Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Works council    0.552*** (0.143)  
      -0.060 
(0.060)  
Works council  
Type A  
    0.685*** 
(0.145)  
0.011 
(0.063) 
Works council  
Type B  
0.188 
(0.200)  
  -0.246*** 
(0.091) 
p-value of F-test  
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BSE SE   0.005  0.002 
  
No. of obs. 5281 
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Table A5 
Regression results of the main independent variables without establishments that do not state labor 
costs (N>20) 
Bivariate Probit 
                            Dep. Var. 
 
Variables 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Over- 
employment 
Over- 
payment 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Coeff. 
(Std.error) 
Works council     0.293*** (0.082) 
-0.061 
(0.062)   
Works council (Type A)      0.360*** (0.086) 
0.009 
(0.066) 
Works council (Type B)   0.127 (0.113) 
  -0.231*** 
(0.082) 
p-value of Wald test [ 0  ] <0.001 <0.001 
McFadden-R2 0.071 0.073 
No. of obs. 3261 
Notes: See Table A3. 
 
Table A6  
Effects of works councils on overemployment and on overpayment without establishments that do not 
state labor costs (N>20) 
Notes: See Table A4. 
 
 
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Overemployment Overpayment 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Marginal effects 
(Std. error) 
Works council        0.051*** (0.014)  
      -0.023 
(0.023)  
Works council (Type A)     0.065*** (0.016) 
 0.003 
(0.025) 
Works council (Type B)  0.023 (0.022) 
   -0.083*** 
(0.029) 
p-value of  of F-test 
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BME ME   0.029            0.002 
 Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Semi-elasticities 
(Std. error) 
Works council    0.530*** (0.151)  
      -0.059 
(0.060)  
Works council  
Type A  
   0.640*** 
(0.153)  
0.009 
(0.064) 
Works council  
Type B  
0.224 
(0.195)  
  -0.237*** 
(0.089) 
p-value of F-test  
WoCo Type A WoCo Type BSE SE   0.015  0.003 
  
No. of obs. 3261 
 
 
